The MapInfluenCE project focuses on both China and Russia’s influence in Central Europe, specifically within the Visegrad nations of Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. The comparative nature of the project enables identification of the strategies and tactics employed by China and Russia and discern the convergences and divergences in their respective approaches.
Our Topics
We have been actively mapping China’s image in Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovak media since the very start of the project. We focus on the overall perception of China in mainstream and alternative media, be it public or private media outlets. Also, we focus on coverage of particular issues by different media outlets, such as the human rights situation in China, Chinese investments, economic cooperation with China, participation of Chinese vendors in 5G networks rollout, etc. We have also focused on how pro-China narratives enter the media discourse. MapInfluenCE provided first hard data evidence for the link between Chinese investment into media and a change in coverage. Specifically, the entrance of the Chinese capital into Czech media led to exclusively positive coverage of China with neutral and negative reporting all but disappearing. Based on our research, the European Union and several member states, including the Czech Republic, added media into their legislation on the screening of foreign investments. We believe that media owned by investors from non-democratic countries are used to disseminate the foreign government’s positions and their activities can thus endanger the foreign policy consensus, influence political preferences of the population, and ultimately lead to societal division.
We have analyzed the strategy and tactics employed by China in establishing its position in Central Europe. China is a relative newcomer in the countries of the Visegrad Four (V4) and it lacks the necessary infrastructure for spreading its influence. Therefore, China has made use of political and economic elites with vested interests in cooperating with China. Chinese presence in the region has only diversified from this point into other areas such as sub-national relations, academic ties, and media cooperation in recent years. In each of these areas, we have seen dynamic development.
China does not use a one-size-fits-all approach in Central Europe. Our research shows that while China’s goal of establishing a friendly environment and its strategy to achieve this end are similar in all four countries, its tactics differ in reaction to the local political climate, geopolitical position of the country, and the level of bilateral relations. In the initial stage, China uses positive inducements (‘carrots’). The use of coercion (‘sticks’) is predominantly linked to the question of China’s sovereignty such as Tibet or Taiwan. China also frequently signals the use of sticks to force the other side to make concessions. The effectiveness of this approach weighs on the credibility of China’s threats and the potential ancillary costs incurred by such threats.
We have analyzed the formation, content, and distribution of pro-China narratives not only in mainstream media, but also in alternative outlets and via social media. We have mapped the so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy” and the intensified efforts of Chinese external propaganda in relations to the Hong Kong protests, the repressions in Xinjiang, spread of disinformation about the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, the “vaccine diplomacy“, etc. We also focus on the interplay between China’s and Russia’s efforts in the information space in Central Europe and analyze their effectiveness. We are interested in the presence of pro-China narratives in pro-Kremlin media, the use of PR agencies, cooperation agreements on content sharing with local media, employment of influencers, and other indirect tools of influencing the media environment and public debate. Thanks to the comparative nature of the project, we can track the new trends in Chinese propaganda and disinformation and ascertain whether they are also present in other Central European nations. Moreover, we can analyze the commonalities and differences in the form and content of Chinese propaganda messaging in different countries and identify the factors explaining them.
We have focused on how China has tried to co-opt the political and economic elites in Central Europe, the interplay of political and business interests, discourse on China in national parliaments, and the issues of strategic corruption. We have mapped narratives that are being presented by key agenda setters, highlighting their links to China. In the case of the Czech Republic, we created an interactive map in 2018, visualizing the links between key actors involved in Czech China policy. The map shows the linkages based on party membership, current and past business activities, personal connections, and more. Apart from that, we have undertaken research on the political parties’ and individual politicians’ stances towards China over the past decades. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, we have covered the debates on China in the national parliaments spanning 25 years (1993-2018). We have also mapped the situation in Slovakia and Poland.
We have focused on China’s efforts to influence the academic environment in Central Europe. The tools employed by China include financial support for academic institutions, sponsorship of academic courses, financial support for individual academics, censorship and pressure on instilling self-censorship, efforts to control Chinese students, and setting-up of Confucius Institutes. We have dealt with the protection of academic institutions from Chinese influence, curbing of academic freedom, intellectual property theft, etc. We are not categorically against all forms of academic cooperation with Chinese academic and research entities. However, we support increasing awareness and resilience of universities on the potential risks cooperation can entail, and call for strengthening transparency in terms of the content and conditions of the cooperation, including financial support. At the same time, we believe it is necessary that the universities maintain their academic autonomy.
We analyze the position of the Visegrad countries (V4) in EU policy on Russia as well as bilateral relations between the V4 countries and Russia. It is these factors that define the basis for interaction between Russia and Central Europe. The fragmented position of the Visegrad countries towards Russia, ranging from Polish outright rejection to Hungarian efforts to actively cooperate, represents an interesting mix of dynamics for Russian foreign policy, which is traditionally guided by the “divide and rule” principle in Europe. Hence, our focus on this division, the interests of national elites, and lacking social resilience to Russian interventions, including in the information space. Finally, we examine the role of the V4 nations in shaping relations with Russia within the framework of the common European foreign policy and through the Visegrad group’s engagement in Brussels, which have undergone dramatic changes recently.
The latest MapInfluenCE research project combines the experience gained from previous in-depth analyses of the portrayal of China in Central European media with expertise in the specific environment of alternative media, which are notorious for their pro-Russian leanings.
Russia and China’s efforts to gain influence in the local media environment have been previously analysed mostly separately, and the question of whether Russia and China are collaborating in the dissemination of narratives has remained largely unanswered. Our research, therefore, answers the fundamental question about the nature of the intertwining of Chinese and Russian narratives and provides a comprehensive and unique analysis of Central European alternative media coverage of key China-related issues. It also provides new insights into the functioning of the alternative media scene.
We intend to continue with mapping of the intersection of Chinese and Russian information operations, their strategies and tools. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of this issue and the growing tendency of China and Russia to share narratives, mostly in contexts where it is convenient for their efforts to reform the international environment to better suit the needs of authoritarian regimes.