After the change of government at the end of last year, the Czech Republic decided to prioritise the eastern vector in its foreign policy and further bolster some of its elements. Based on the coalition agreement as well as the governmental programme, the cabinet of Petr Fiala pushed for a review of relations with Russia and China and continued a traditional Czech focus on the countries of the Eastern Partnership as well as the Western Balkans. These thematic areas were present in the thinking of the previous government, especially after the Vrbětice affair last year, which escalated tensions in Czech-Russian relations to unprecedented levels. However, the Fiala government added a strong new pillar of democracy and human rights, which should symbolise a return to the legacy of Václav Havel of the 1990s and a strong normative approach to international relations. One sign of this is the plan to adopt a Czech version of the Magnitsky Act by the end of this year, which should punish violators of democracy and human rights or corruption around the globe in the Czech context too.
The political transition of power, with all its usual turbulence, also came at the same time as a great upheaval for Eastern Europe and the world, following the previously unimaginable events of 24 February 2022. Whilst the Czech Republic already had a well shaped perception of Russia as a threat and aggressor, including at the wider societal level, nonetheless many structural dependencies were and still are present in the two countries’ bilateral relations, primarily in the area of energy, but to a lesser degree also in economy and mutual trade or military cooperation. Though attempts had been made to phase out these dependencies already before the events of February 2022, when combined with a relatively slow start to the building of relations with foreign partners, budget cuts and a weak capacity of the state, this created a situation of practically constant crisis-management thinking and taking many swift and/ or ad hoc measures to complex problems and structural issues. This was, for example, visible in the slow response to the energy crisis, which is still largely missing any comprehensive plan for the worst case scenario of a complete cut off of Russian oil and gas or any complex communication strategy towards the wider public.
One effect of the Russian war against Ukraine has been to speed up many processes in Czech-Russian ties or vis-à-vis Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership. Issues that would under “normal” circumstances have taken many months or years were dealt with within weeks. One concrete example was the Czech withdrawal from the so-called Russian banks stationed in Budapest, which the previous government had blocked due to the uncertain fate of the Czech money deposited in the bank and an unwillingness of part of the political elite to act, partially due to the influence of the Czech President Miloš Zeman. Another example was the Czech push for Ukrainian candidacy status, which it decided to lead on alongside other EU member states too. Many other issues, including the fight against disinformation and Russian propaganda or the establishment of a system of strategic (and crisis) communication of the state were taken on with much more urgency after the change of government and were further fuelled after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine’s territory.
In general, it is possible to characterise the Czech response to the war as highly normative, security-driven and embedded in the broadly defined common European and Western framework. This is particularly with regards to Russia, in which the Czech Republic since day one pushed for a strong and complex sanctions mechanism on multiple levels and a complete isolation of the country, but also vis-à-vis Ukraine. The Czech Republic has found a new leadership capacity to not only deliver much needed arms, including the more sophisticated ones, but also to accept hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the war in their home country. Being a strongly polarising issue, the context of the Russian war helped to overcome some of the previous mental patterns associated with the so-called migration crisis of 2014/15. The Czech Republic together with Poland and Slovakia also positioned itself at the forefront of the crisis management, clearly outperforming some of the bigger and wealthier EU members. This was symbolised, for example, by the Czech, Polish and Slovenian PMs being the first to visit Kyiv after the outbreak of the war and a number of other political but also very practical gestures of support towards Ukraine. Furthermore, the Czech Republic – for the first time ever – decided to lead the NATO battle group in Slovakia as part of the extended so-called enhanced forward presence together with Germany, the Netherlands and the United States and other international partners.
This political and mental switch moved the Czech Republic closer to the Eastern flank of the EU and NATO in terms of their foreign and security policy thinking. This meant a further cooling off in relations with Budapest, which continued with an ambivalent and unconstructive position vis-à-vis the conflict and Russia itself, but it also brought the Czech position much closer to the Polish or the Baltic one, standing firmly on value and security-driven grounds when coping with the crisis. Despite some level of domestic criticism, the Czech Republic also continued to play a bridging role in relations with Germany and to some extent also France, which due to the slow pace of their reaction to the Russian aggression and mixed signals sent to Moscow have been losing credibility and trust among Central and Eastern European members of the EU. This should be seen positively since the Czech Republic – especially in the run up to its presidency of the Council of the EU – managed to play a leading role in the region, also when speaking to the bigger EU members.
On the other hand, it is clear that within Czech society there are political and societal voices critical of the strongly normative and comprehensive approach of the government, partially associated with the pro-Kremlin camp, even if it has lost a lot of ground and public support – including from the President Miloš Zeman. A dichotomy between economic instability and rising levels of inflation, and the rather strong Czech support towards refugees has found its way into the political life of the country and pushed many to ask for how long it will be possible to sustain the political momentum and strong societal consensus, including within the five-party-government of the ruling block.
This new level of leadership, very well recognised at the international level, also manifested in the review of the upcoming priorities for the Czech EU Council presidency, which were reshaped and moved to address the current crisis situation, which had caught the French presidency not only unprepared, but also in the middle of their presidential and parliamentary election campaigns, which had prioritised a rather domestic-looking perspective for the French policy makers.
The cabinet of Petr Fiala rightly decided to react otherwise and elevate the response to the crisis to the top of the Czech EU priorities. Officially based around the five key areas for the presidency, the government prepared a so-called 5-point-plan for Ukraine to show to international partners its readiness to deliver in several key areas, including rewarding Ukraine with candidacy status, organising a high level Ukraine conference with the leadership of the country and preparing a donor conference, which would raise funds for immediate needs as well as the post-conflict recovery, among other things. In this way, the government put Ukraine and the response to the war as its cross-cutting priority.
Beyond this, the Czech Republic plans to continue with their tough approach towards Russia in terms of sanctions, punishing war crimes by promoting the establishment of the international legal tribunal and isolation of the country in the international arena, even if the government itself faces some key dilemmas in how far to go, for instance, on the question of energy dependency and redirecting to alternative sources of oil and gas. Other dilemmas are connected to the domestic situation and political debate as well as European values, when it comes to – for example – the question of frozen assets of sanctioned companies, oligarchs or other representatives of the Russian regime, which are governed by the rule of law mechanism and protection of private property, unlike in Russia or Belarus. Finally, the government has to decide to what extent it wants to focus on the current political reality in Russia and how much it is ready to support and cooperate with the pro-democracy actors who could bring about some kind of change in the country in the future since they have so far stood back on this. This was, for example, visible during the negotiations on help towards the Russian and Belarusian civil societies and critiques of both regimes, which at least at the beginning were not really in the focus of the governmental approach.
On the question of the EU’s eastern policy, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far sent only mixed messages wishing for – on the one hand – a comprehensive change to the policy, but on the other also the continuation of some of its basic principles of cooperation with the Eastern European states. Czech diplomacy has clearly prioritised Ukraine, given the atrocious Russian aggression that the country has been facing, although the official position is still that all three associated countries deserve to become members of the EU one day, despite the fact that Georgia was not given candidate status by the European Council decision on 23 and 24 June 2022.
One of the crucial parts of the debate is the question of “Wider Europe”, which is back on the EU decision-making table as well as the inter-connected setup of enlargement policy, which has stalled in the past decade and suffers from deep structural problems as well as a lack of political will within several member states. The Czech Republic is going to need to take a proactive stance and play the role of mediator and honest broker e.g. within the rather emotional and subjective debates between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Achieving progress in some of the complicated issues tied to the membership perspectives of the Western Balkan countries would help mitigate the grievances of some of these states regarding the possible accession of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries. Both Albania and North Macedonia have clearly taken a condemnatory stance on the Russian war and deserve the EU’s help and future perspective.
An important – and yet still unexplored – part of the debate is bringing other EU members to endorse and support practical steps towards Ukraine’s and Moldova‘s integration, resilience and, in the case of Ukraine, post-war reconstruction. Even though the Czech Republic has developed a strong line of argumentation on why it is necessary to bring Ukraine closer to the EU and deliver concrete benefits to its citizens, it has not yet invested enough in establishing a wide political consensus among the EU states, particularly those which are less interested or inclined to follow suit. This aspect touches on a long term underlying problem of capacity and resources, which are not always sufficient to achieve even the most important foreign policy priorities, due to the secondary importance of the foreign policy portfolios in the Czech domestic political debate.
On the other hand, during the Czech EU Council presidency, its leading position within the EU on mediating among the European members on key policy areas, including energy, migration, economic recovery and investment or the future of Europe (among other things) make the Czech Republic an important ally and might help the country to increase its political and international profile, if approached strategically and with the proper tactics of establishing a strong alliance among like-minded EU members as well as discussing potential opportunities with the less interested ones.
For that reason, Czech-German and Czech-French relations are going to be of crucial importance (not only) in the coming months. The Czech-German strategic dialogue, which too often lacks concrete substance, might represent a promising platform for the debate on the future of Eastern Europe as well as relations with Ukraine and Russia. Similarly to that, France has officially been declared a foreign policy partner and an important ally in the governmental programme, and this needs to materialise more in practice, also when it comes to high-level visits and more active exchange and dialogue.
On the Russia front, it is essential to continue with the review of mutual ties and finish the ongoing processes of cutting ties, while trying to minimise the risks. Now, it is practically impossible to keep the ties and continue with the previous international cooperation projects. At the same time, it is critical to continue with the traditional priority areas, such as the support of civil society, independent media and democratisation in the wider sense, in which the Czech Republic has invested over many years. In order to achieve this, the government needs to take proactive measures to support the priority groups on the Russian side and return to its previous foreign policy tradition of the Masaryk’s Russian Aid Operation towards the pro-democratic/ anti-bolshevik part of the Russian society on multiple levels. One good example of this effort is the governmental programme “Civil Society”, which represents a first step in this direction. Outreach and (strategic) communication to the Russian society as well as the Russian and the Russian-speaking community in the Czech Republic represent another crucial component of the debate.
In addition to the EU‘s Russia policy, the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU and Czech foreign policy in general need to recalibrate Eastern Partnership policy as a part of the upcoming debate on the Wider Europe concept. It is necessary to establish a new balance between a stronger bilateral track (differentiation), especially with the Associated Trio, and the multilateral dimension (inclusivity) to keep Belarusian or Azerbaijani civil society and pro-EU parts of their societies inside the policy framework. This is also important for Armenia, which is facing turbulent times at home, while being limited by the geopolitical nature of its conflict with Azerbaijan. This must be done in order to preserve a comprehensive EU eastern policy towards the region. It is also crucial for the Czech national priorities, which are traditionally connected with democratisation, civil society support and engagement as well as achieving prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe, for which the EU‘s concept and understanding of resilience is still the most relevant one.
Last but not least, security is going to play a key role with Eastern European countries. In this area, the Czech government should return to some past ideas in promoting closer cooperation with the security and intelligence agencies of Eastern European states, which has now become an open necessity when facing the war with Russia. The Czech leadership of the NATO battlegroup in Slovakia illustrates that our successes and foreign and security courage might benefit the country from many directions. These concrete initiatives and ideas are going to be particularly important following the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, bringing the Alliance into a new security reality.
The Czech Republic, with its strong and credible transatlantic bond, might also offer the right diplomatic channel to facilitate closer coordination with the US, including when it comes to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, military cooperation or energy. It is essential to keep Western unity and a common approach both towards Russia as well as Ukraine. One concrete example is the donor conference on the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine that the Czech Republic is planning to host together with the United States, which might help to bridge the gap inside the EU27 on that issue.
While it is key to manage the presidency of the Council of the EU well, and the foreign policy portfolio in a wider sense, it is also essential to keep things stable on the domestic front and facilitate a strong domestic consensus for the crisis response, which would also have broad public support. The government needs to make sure that its eastern policy does not fall victim to populist and pro-Russian cliques within the Parliament, which would benefit from chaos and divisions inside of the society and the ruling elite. For that, it is – first of all – essential to further invest in strategic communication and work with the Czech and wider European public as well as to reach a wider transatlantic solidarity, and sustain strong mutual bonds and a common approach to the crisis as the only way out of the current escalation with Russia.
To conclude, the Czech Republic has a good and solid starting position to move from an average – or even underperforming in some respects – member of the Western alliance into a leader and credible partner on the international stage. However, it needs to have the right mindset, invest additional resources in boosting its capacity to act and facilitate the domestic discussion and keep the instability at bay. If it succeeds, it is going to dramatically increase its profile and potential for future coalition building and new ways of cooperation, which it should use for its own benefit.
This article was originally published as part of the annual publication Agenda for Czech Foreign Policy by Association for International Affairs (AMO).
