Over the past year, the Czech Republic has been developing its own position towards the Indo-Pacific region, in line with the strategy of the EU and of key allies, including the US. The framing of the foreign policy in the region as part of a broader approach, both in terms of geographic scope and sectoral focus, has provided a new conceptual framework for Czech engagement in the region and for bilateral ties with key partners. This is true also for ties with China, whose geopolitical rise with its consequences on politics, economy, and security, is the often-unstated, but nevertheless key factor in the birth of the Indo-Pacific concept a few years ago.
For the Czech Republic, developing a comprehensive approach towards the Indo-Pacific as the most dynamic global region that provides economic opportunities but is also home to potential security flashpoints is no less important than for major powers. The development of the Czech approach towards the Indo-Pacific started already under the government led by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. In September 2021, Czech Foreign Minister Jakub Kulhánek appointed an experienced diplomat, Libor Sečka, previous Ambassador to Beijing and London, to the post of special envoy for the Indo-Pacific. The Czech Republic also started to devise its own Indo-Pacific strategy, following the national strategies of France, Germany, and the Netherlands and the EU joint strategy. The Czech Republic also made the decision to put the development of the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific as one of the key focus areas of its presidency of the Council of the EU. The road to the presidency has been accompanied by close coordination with the presidency of France which is the leading actor in the EU’s policy towards the region.
The increased focus on the Indo-Pacific has mirrored the political priorities of the new government. The government programme committed to deepen cooperation with key partners in the Indo-Pacific, explicitly mentioning India, South Korea, and Taiwan. Moreover, the programme set out the goal of revising ties with China (as well as Russia), which remains Czech Republic’s strategic partner.
For the first months of the new government’s tenure, due to other more pressing international developments, China policy has remained on the margin of the government’s interests. Bilateral ties have remained in the state of hibernation which has characterised them since at least 2019. In general, there was a certain cautiousness on the part of the Czech diplomacy towards China, while the process of the revision of ties with China, envisioned by the government programme, was initiated.
The Russian war against Ukraine has understandably occupied the attention of Czech policymakers, especially as the Czech Republic has been at the forefront of the EU’s assistance to Ukraine and has pushed for a harsher reaction to Russia’s aggression. In this context, “opening another front” with China would put the Czech Republic in a difficult position. Moreover, the government has maintained an uneasy co-habitation with President Zeman, who has remained the most outspoken pro-China voice on the Czech political scene. On several issues, the new government seems to have tried to avoid a direct conflict with Zeman. This might have led the government to shelve any key change in China policy until after Zeman finishes his second term in 2023 and a new president takes office. One manifestation of this divergence was the issue of the Beijing Olympic Games Boycott, where the new government failed to coordinate a joint stance with the President.
However, Czech diplomacy gradually started to make more ambitious steps on China policy, also in the context of the unease with China’s position on the war in Ukraine. Minister Lipavský met with Penpa Tsering, the leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile, during his visit to the United States in April. Soon after, Lipavský also publicly met with the Taiwanese representative in Prague, Liang-Ruey Ke, in order to express gratitude for Taiwan’s assistance to the Czech Republic to cope with the inflow of Ukrainian refugees. While seemingly trivial, this meeting created an important precedent for official meetings with Taiwanese officials. The new confident stance of the administration on ties with Taiwan was confirmed by the visit of the President of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan You Si-kun to Prague in July 2021 and his meetings with Senate and Parliamentary leaders as well as the Deputy Foreign Minister. Commenting on the visit, Prime Minister Fiala reiterated Czech adherence to One-China Policy while noting the right of Czech politicians to meet with Taiwanese representatives owing to the “friendly relations” with Taiwan.
The broader framework of the Czech approach towards China, embedded within the EU approach, also continued to present new challenges. After the tumultuous developments of the past few years, marked by growing political tensions and a salvo of reciprocal sanctions in 2021, EU-China relations took another hit after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While officially trying to appear neutral, China has supported Russia’s justification for the war as the result of concerted NATO and US pressure on Russia’s strategic space and ignoring of its “legitimate security interests”. Moreover, China has supported Russia’s goal of reconstructing the European security architecture in line with its long-term strategic objective of weakening EU-US ties.
China’s repeated attacks on NATO and the support for Russia’s aim to redraw European security order have been seen particularly sensitively in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic. In April, Chinese Special Envoy for China-CEE cooperation (also a former ambassador to the Czech Republic) Huo Yuzhen visited Prague as part of an eight-country tour of CEE. The purpose of the mission was to explore the interest of the CEE countries in the future development of 16+1 cooperation as well as to explain China’s position on Ukraine. During the meeting with Huo, the Czech Foreign Ministry communicated Czech concerns over China’s relationship with Russia which were previously relayed also to Chinese chargé d‘affaires.
On May 19, 2022, the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution concerning 16+1. The resolution stated that the cooperation has not brought any tangible benefits during its 10-year history and has served mostly as a tool for China to pursue its unilateral interests. This assessment was also shared by the Czech Foreign Ministry, which noted virtually no benefits from the cooperation for the Czech Republic in any of the key focus areas. The non-binding committee resolution called for decreasing Czech involvement in 16+1 activities and leaving the platform altogether.
The presidency of the Council of the EU is a key test of the Czech ability to positively shape the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific region in numerous areas as defined by the EU, but also in those of the upcoming Czech Indo-Pacific strategy. There is a need to present the EU as an actor that is committed to long-term substantial engagement with regional partners despite the increased need to pay attention to security in the immediate neighbourhood following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The EU is seen as a promising partner by the countries in the region, who appreciate the positive role that the EU can play in bridging the growing dichotomization of the region’s geopolitical architecture within the framework of US-China rivalry. This is especially the case in terms of the EU’s support for the ASEAN centrality in the multilateral structure of the region, which has recently been eroded due to the growing role of minilaterals.
While security is only one of the pillars of the EU’s Indo-Pacific approach, it has undoubtedly been put to the forefront of Czech and other Western nations’ foreign policy considerations since the Russian invasion. Due to the need to significantly increase defence expenditures and refocus on the security situation in the immediate neighbourhood, the EU nations‘ ability to step up their hard security role in the Indo-Pacific now seems even more uncertain than before. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic will be trying to contribute to security cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners, especially in the niche areas of cyber security and hybrid threats. Czech Republic has already built a significant reputation in these fields, not least due to the leading role on the issue of 5G security evidenced by the Prague Proposals that were pivotal in highlighting the non-technical aspects of 5G security. Japan and South Korea are set to become even more important partners in the region for both the EU as a whole and the Czech Republic, with an increasingly crucial pillar being the strategic and security dimension of the relationship, exemplified also by the closer cooperation with NATO of both actors.
The trade and connectivity agenda in the Indo-Pacific is going to feature high on the agenda of the Czech presidency. The Czech Republic can play a positive role in boosting trade liberalisation negotiations with key partners in the region. Apart from the FTA with New Zealand concluded just before the start of the Czech presidency, after the Australian elections in May 2022, there is hope of a reset of ties with the EU (mostly in terms of bilateral ties with France) and reviving the FTA negotiations between the two sides. In the connectivity agenda, the key challenge will be to come up with specific deliverables within the framework of the new Global Gateway strategy, which is quite transparently devised as an answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The goal of the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU in this field should thus be to highlight the EU’s role as an eager economic partner that wants to make a constructive contribution to the Indo-Pacific region’s development by delivering on specific high-visibility issues. Giving the EU‘s involvement a recognizable brand could boost the EU’s image in the region and contribute to its standing. So far, the EU has been lacking in its response to China’s involvement in infrastructure development and it needs to realise that apart from criticising China’s way of doing business and patronising the receiving countries, it also needs to present a positive alternative that can be embraced by regional partners.
The Czech Republic can also take advantage of the increased willingness on the EU level to boost ties with Taiwan, motivated to a large extent by the awareness of the strategic importance of Taiwan in global supply chains and efforts to attract Taiwanese investment in the European semiconductor sector. Czech Republic could lobby for pushing forward the Bilateral Investment Agreement with Taiwan, although the Commission remains cold on the proposal due to the significant political capital needed to push for the deal as well as the view that its benefit will be limited. In any case, the role of Taiwan will be pivotal in the context of the EU’s efforts to upgrade its own semiconductor industry.
The Czech Republic can also utilise its EU Council presidency and its seat in the Human Rights Council to continue with its tradition of human rights promotion also in the Indo-Pacific. The focus on China, with the continued mass oppression of the Uyghurs and other minorities, is warranted, and the current government has shown significantly more willingness to call out China also on the political level. Based on the proposal by foreign minister Lipavský, the Czech government passed a version of the Magnitsky Act, which might also be applicable to Chinese officials. At the same time, it is also necessary not to ignore human rights abuses elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region, even in countries that might sometimes be classified as “like-minded”, for example India.
Last but not least, the Czech Republic can use the opportunity of its presidency to diversify its network of bilateral partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, including strengthening ties with South Korea, Japan, India, Taiwan and the ASEAN countries and creating synergies with key partners within the EU as well, such as France, who is the leading EU power in the region. This can have a lasting positive effect on Czech Republic’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region, which can outlive the presidency.
China policy as such is unlikely to figure high in terms of the Czech presidency’s agenda. EU-China cooperation is growing increasingly distant in terms of the political dialogue, despite the rising bilateral trade numbers. The war in Ukraine and China’s stance is going to remain a chief factor influencing the relationship, despite China’s efforts to avoid the issue and compartmentalise ties with the EU. China is highly unlikely to distance itself from its ties with Russia just to appease the European capitals. China has so far been unable to grasp the impact of the war in Ukraine on Europe, only viewing it through the prism of US interests. The Chinese argument that sees the EU as an actor without its own agency and as subordinated to US geopolitical interests is most likely not just a tool of external propaganda but a genuine reflection of the views of the Chinese leadership and is unlikely to change. China is still expecting that under the heavy economic costs of sanctions, political unity in the EU will crumble, and the European public will become discontented, leading to an urgent need for the EU to reconsider and improve ties with China.
While China can ultimately profit from damaged European unity, especially as the Russian war against Ukraine turns into a protracted conflict, the prospects for revived EU-China cooperation are limited. The controversial CAI (Comprehensive Agreement on Investments) will probably remain frozen during the Czech presidency as any progress has been conditioned on China’s lifting of sanctions on EU politicians and official bodies. While China has already ratified relevant ILO conventions, as put forward in the CAI, and indicated a willingness to lift sanctions if the EU proceeds first, such a move is highly unlikely. On the political level, EU-China ties are likely to stall, and the nature of the relationship will mostly be shaped by the further development of the EU’s internal autonomous defence mechanisms, including the International Procurement Instrument and especially the Anti-Coercion Instrument.
The trend of increasingly close EU-US cooperation on addressing China is going to continue. The divisions over the AUKUS deal that created a significant rift in France-US relations have already been mostly smoothed out, in significant part due to the bolstered transatlantic unity spurred by the Russian aggression. The EU and US have also further developed their dialogue and coordination of China policy, including via the high-level EU-US Dialogue on China as well as the Trade and Technology Council. The need to foster a common approach on various issues from the unification of export controls and better protection of emerging technologies to the resilience of value chains is going to become even more important going forward. In this regard, coming on the heels of the French presidency, which continued to put a premium on the opaque concept of EU strategic autonomy, the Czech Republic can leverage its close relationship with the US to bolster cooperation between Brussels and Washington, including in the Indo-Pacific.
The most important challenge for the EU and the US will be to derive lessons from Russia’s aggression and the resulting rapid salvo of sanctions – leading to de facto economic decoupling – for a similar escalation with Beijing. With China, the challenges of the EU’s strategic dependencies are several magnitudes more complicated than in the case of Russia. This is even more the case as the EU sets upon a clean energy transition, which might lead to the creation of even more dependencies on China in critical sectors, due to China’s dominance in rare earths and other areas. China’s use of economic coercion against Lithuania has shown that it is more than willing to weaponize global supply chains to achieve political goals.
The most significant move that can be expected in terms of the Czech bilateral approach towards China during the presidency is an exit from the 16+1 format. In August 2022, Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania’s decision the year before to cease participation in the format, underscoring the continuing decay of the cooperation platform. Regarding the future of the grouping, as indicated by the mission of the Chinese special envoy Huo Yuzhen, China is exploring the possibility of holding a ministerial meeting of 16+1 countries in autumn 2022 instead of a prime minister/ head of state level meeting as has been the case before. The move is an apparent reaction to the decreased interest on the part of the CEE countries in the platform, and a preemptive effort to weaken damage to China’s prestige and interests. In similar China-led bi-multilateral groupings such as FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) and CCF (China-CELAC Forum), ministerial meetings are held only every three years, sometimes replaced by high-level summits involving top leaders. A similar scenario involving decreasing the profile and frequency of meetings of 16+1 is likely. Based on a clear assessment that 16+1 has not brought any benefits to the Czech Republic, Prague is likely to stop participation in the platform altogether, although it remains to be seen in what ways the decision will be arrived at and officially communicated. As the 16+1 is not an international organisation and there is no treaty-based relationship to the platform, the decision is a political one. It will thus depend on the agreement of the government, with a potential role to be played by President Zeman. While the format can hardly be seen as a benefit for the Czech Republic, the potential exit from the format should be accompanied by a specific proposal on how to include all the member states, including CEE countries, in the formulation of the EU’s China policy. This is especially the case as simultaneously with the decreasing relevance of the 16+1 platform, the France-Germany-China summits have continued. Moreover, ideally, the Czech exit from the format would be coordinated with other participating CEE countries to signal unity and shield against China’s reaction – in this regard, the exit of Baltic countries was already a missed chance.
This article was originally published as part of the annual publication Agenda for Czech Foreign Policy by Association for International Affairs (AMO).
